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SIGNING NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN A REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RIE It is
correct to describe procuration as a specific form of agency, viz:
"the art of constituting another one's attorney in fact".' A signature

by procuration indicates a limited authority in the signer and the
legal significance of such a signature, at least as far as negotiable
instruments are concerned, is covered by s. 51 of the Bills of Exchange
3
Act.

This article will deal with the problem created by the absence of
the words "per pro" or their equivalent to a signature. In these cases
the signor relies on other facts or circumstances surrounding his
signature to indicate that he did not intend to sign the document in
his personal capacity. The examination to follow will be limited to
documents caught by the Bills of Exchange Act4 which have been
signed by an employee of a limited company who has at the relevant
time the authority to negotiate such an instrument. The general
principles which will emerge are applicable to documents outside the
Bills of Exchange Act 5 as well. S. 52 is itself a statutory embodiment
of the common law which applies to all written contracts.
The problem is highlighted in negotiable instruments by the
effect of s. 131 of the Act. S. 131 excludes from liability on any
negotiable instrument anyone who has not signed it as a drawer,
endorser or acceptor, while in the case of other contracts, "both
principal and agent may be liable on one signature."'6 Hence it is
crucial to determine in the case of negotiable instruments whether a
signature is that of the principal or that of the agent for normally 7
only one may be liable.
The problem is one of frequent occurrence because of the nature
of a company, which must necessarily act through the medium of
agents or servants. Thus, when a company becomes insolvent, the
receiver of a cheque or promissory note will try to establish the
liability of the agent or servant who signed the instrument rather
than wait his turn along with the other creditors of the company.
Sec. 52(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act s states that:
Where a person signs a bill as drawer, endorser or acceptor, and adds
words to his signature indicating that he signs it for or on behalf of a
I Black's Legal Dictionary, 4th ed. 1372.
2 Some examples of such a signature are:
A per pro P
A by procuration of P
A pp. P.
For a discussion of the effect of the various forms of such a signature see
2 O.H.L.J. (1960-61) 102.
3RS.C. 1952 c. 16, s.51.
4 See; supra, footnote 3.
5
6 See; supra,footnote 3.
Falconbridge, Banking and Bills of Exchange (1956) 6 ed. at p. 591.
7There may be an exception in "undisclosed principal" cases but I will
deal 8with this later.
See; supra, footnote 3.
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principal, or in a representative character, he is not personally liable
thereon; but the mere addition to his signature of words describing him
as an agent or as filling a representative capacity, does not exempt him
from personal liability.

The question which this section necessarily raises is simply
whether the signor of the document has sufficiently indicated on its
face that he signs as an agent of the company, or whether he makes
himself personally liable. S. 52(1) states that in determining this

question "the construction most favourable to the validity of the
instrument shall be adopted."9

We can only speculate that because businessmen must prefer to
settle these matters among themselves in order to expedite the
mechanics of everyday commercial transactions the courts are spared
the arduous task of doing it for them in multitudinous civil actions.

The businessman who receives a negotiable instrument interprets it
with regard to the usage and custom of the trade and takes into

account all the pertinent circumstances surrounding the instrument.
In result, the receiver seldom has any doubt who is intended to be

liable on the instrument On the other hand, the court, except in the
unusual case, determines the intention of the parties solely on the
basis of what is within the four corners of the document. It will
not consider any of the available extrinsic evidence to help it determine
the true intention of the parties.
As Lord Denman said:
If there be a contract which has been reduced to writing, verbal evidence
is not allowed to be given of what passed between the parties, either
before the written instrument was made or during the time that it was
in a state of preparation, so as to add to or subtract from, or, in any
manner to vary or qualify the written contract.o
This rule, known as the 'parol evidence' rule, covers any extrinsic

evidence, whether parol or real, and applies equally to all written
contracts. In practice, the strictness of this rule is evaded in situations

which may be considered as exceptions to the general rulen or simply

as cases falling outside the general rule.12 Extrinsic evidence may be
admissible to show a condition precedent to the existence of the contract13 to show fraud, 14 illegality, misrepresentation,' 5 mistake'6 or

duress, etc. Although extrinsic evidence cannot be admitted to vary
or contradict the written agreement it is admissible in some circum-

stances to explain it. 17 This general rule as stated by Tindal C.J. in
Shore v. Wilson' s is that extrinsic evidence of the true intentions of
9 See; supra, footnote 3.
Goss3v. Lord Nugent, (1833) 5 B. & Ad. 58 at p. 64.
Cross "Evidence" (1958) p. 476.
12 Norton on Deeds 2nd ed. p. 140.
134 Lindley v. Lacey (1864) 17 C.B. (N.S.) 578.
11 5 DDobell v. Stevens (1825) 3 B. & C. 623.
Pennsylvanie Shipping Co. v. CompagnieNationale de Navigation (1936)
155 L.T. 294.
6 Raffles 'v. Wichelhaus (1864) 2 H. & C. 906.
37 Ohitty on Contracts,Vol. 1, 22 ed. at 640.
18 (1842) C1. & Fin. 355 at p. 365.
10

1
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the parties is admissible when the document itself is ambiguous to the
true expression of those intentions.
Ambiguity is frequently pleaded in the type of case which concerns us here. For the most part, when ambiguity is found, it permits
the signor to convince the court he signed in a representative capacity
and thus avoid personal liability. In determining whether or not
ambiguity surrounds the intentions of the parties, the court will peruse
the entire instrument for any patent inconsistencies in either the body
of the document or the signature. 19 In the case of negotiable instruments the body of the document is comparatively concise and
often of a standard form. It is precisely because the negotiable instrument is so concise that the court will most carefully scrutinize
every possible aspect of the signature to help determine the intention
of the parties. Is the cheque personalized by the company? Is it typed
or written? Is the company's name stamped or printed beside the
signature? Most important, what qualifying words, if any, accompany
the written signature? All these factors are taken into consideration
in helping the court determine if the signature is merely "'descriptio
personae"2 0 or a signature for or on behalf of a principal.
In two cases recently decided by the Ontario Court of Appeal,
with this very problem and they "may be
the court was confronted
22
usefully compared."
In the case of Alliston Creamery v. Grosdanoff &,Tracy2 the
two defendants drew a cheque on The Royal Bank of Canada for the
amount of $344.75 payable to the plaintiff. This cheque was dishonoured upon presentation for payment and we may assumie that the
company which employed the defendants was insolvent although this
is not stated in the judgment. Below the signature of the defendants
there appeared stamped the words, "Highland Grove Farms Ltd."
Gibson, J.A., in a short oral judgment stated that there was some
evidence that the defendants were President and Secretary of the
Highland Grove Farms, Ltd., a purchasing company, and what is more,
that the cheque was given in payment of an account for goods sold by
the appellant to the Highland Grove Farms Ltd.24 After considering
19

See Automobiles Renault Canada Ltd. v. Maritime Import Autos Ltd.

and Kiley (1962) 31 D.L.R. (2d) 592.
20 If John Smith signs a cheque as drawer thusly:
John Smith (signature)
Manager of A.B. Co. Ltd. (stamped)
does the addition of the words "Managerof A.B. Co. Ltd!" serve to describe
John Smith as manager so as to indicate only that he thereby assumes
of how he
no personal liability, or is the addition merely an explanation
7
came to put his name on the cheque, viz. desriptiopersonae.
2
1Aliston Creamery v. Grosdanoff and Tracy (1962) 34 D.L.R. (2d) 189.
H. 2B.2 Etlin Co. Ltd. v. Asselstyne (1962) 34 D.L.R. (2d) 191.
In an editorial note to each case, the editors state that the two cases
"may be usefully compared."
23
Supra,footnote 21.
24 Ibid., at p. 190.
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the relevant sections of the Bills of Exchange Act,25 Gibson J.A.,
concluded:
There is nothing on the face of the cheque in question to indicate that
the respondents occupied any position as officers or officials of the Highland Grove Farms Ltd. or
that they were signing other than in their
own individual capacities. 26
So the respondents were personally liable.
The only case noted by the court in the Alliston Case was that of
Daymond Motors Ltd. v. Thistletown Developments Ltd.2 7 wherein
Roach J.A. stated:
If these appellants intended that they should not be liable as makers,
they could have invoked the provisions of s. 52(1) and indicated that
they were signing these notes in a representative capacity.
This statement is cited by Gibson, J.A., near the end of his judgment
in the Alliston Case but it appears to the author that this statement
is the judgment of the case. The very issue in fact of the Alliston case
is whether or not the defendants had invoked s. 52. Therefore this
passage cited from the Daymond Motors Case has prejudged the
issue rather than dealt with it.
In his reasons for the decision, Gibson J.A., also cites a passage
28
from Falconbridge on Banking and Bills of Exchange:
A man who puts his name to a bill makes himself personally liable,
unless he states upon the face of the bill that he subscribes for another
or by procuration of another which are mere words
of exclusion: Unless
he says plainly '1 am a mere scribe, he is liabe'.29
In the footnote to this passage Falconbridge refers to the cases of
Fairchildet al. v. Ferguson & Nolan0o and Chapman v. Smethurst3 '
which he discusses later in the same chapter 3 2 where the above statement is found. In the Ferguson case a promissory note beginning
"sixty days after date we promise to pay," and signed "R. manager
O.L. Co." was held to bind the company and not R. as the court accepted evidence that both R. and the payees intended to make the
company liable and R. had authority to bind the company by note. The
learned author states that, "this decision gives effect to the intention
of the parties, but it is difficult to reconcile it with a strict reading
of s. 52" 3 It is arguable that the use of the word "we" in the body
of the note indicated that the obligation was that of the Company and
not of R. alone, but the problem was whether R. and the company
were both liable and not just R. Even if the word "we" is more consistent with a company's liability than with an individual's, it is not
25

Supra, footnote 3.

26 Ibid., at p. 190.

27 [1956] O.W.N. 867.
28 Supra, footnote 6.
29 Ibid., at p. 592.
30 (1892) 21 S.C.R. 484.
3312 [1909] 1 K.B. 927.
Supra, footnote 6 at p. 594.
3Ibid,, at p. 594.
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inconsistent with the company and the individual both being liable.3 4
Therefore by exonerating R. from liability, the court gave its attention
to other circumstances which suggested that R. intended to sign in
a representative capacity.
In the Chapman case, the note ran, "I promise... "'and was
signed, "J. H. S. Laundry and Dye Works Ltd. J. H. S. Managing
director," and the action was against J. H. S. personally. Falconbridge
states that:
although the note did not purport to be signed "for" or "on behalf of"
the company, the stamped signature of the company over the written
signature of the defendant was held sufficient to show that It was the
company's note and not the defendant's. 35

and further he states that:
the case of Chapman v. Smethurst seems to indicate a tendency36to look
at the substantial intent rather than the form of the document.

It is submitted that neither in the Ferguson case nor in the
Chapman case did the signor plainly indicate, 'I am a mere scribe', and
yet, in neither case was the signor held liable. Furthermore, the
learned author, it is submitted, indicates by these two cases that this
is no longer the true test to be applied to such documents. This view
would seem to be borne out by the recent case of IndustrialBusinessman's Credit Corp. v. Wainwright Const. Ltd.37 At this point it is
sufficient to say that in this case a person was held not to be liable
on a note because it was not clear from the face of the note that he
was liable. The judgment of that case indicates a tendency of the
court to require the plaintiff to show that the signor intended to be
liable in very clear terms. This is inconsistent with the signor being
required to show that he clearly signs as a mere scribe. This tendency
is not so as to alter the onus on the plaintiff or defendant in the main
issue, it is rather, a tendency to find the document ambiguous if
any doubt appears and not require that the signor indicate plainly
"I am a mere scribe" to avoid liability.
It is submitted that the court in the Afliston case did not appreciate fully the context of the passage cited from Falconbridge. That
passage does not state that the test today is to demand in substance
the form "I am a mere scribe". What it does indicate is that the court
should look to the substantial intention of the parties.
In the Alliston case neither of the defendants indicated on the
cheque itself that they were officers of the company. However,
evidence that they were officers was disclosed during the course of
the trial. This, coupled with the fact that the name of the company
was stamped on the cheque, would have permitted the court, had they
34

as to whether the word 'T' or "we" is best used by a company see

IndustrialBusinessman's Credit Corp. v. Wainuight Construction Ltd. [1962]
O.W.N.
31 at 34.
35
36 Supra, footnote 6 at p. 594.
Ibid., at p. 594.
3
7 Supra, footnote 34.

Notes
considered this- evidence, to hold the instrument ambiguous. And
so a way would have been open to the defendants to prove their true
intentions. This is further justified by the fact that evidence was also
admitted which showed that the cheque was in payment of goods sold
by the appellant to the Highland Grove Farms, Ltd. but this, too, was
not considered because of the parol evidence rule. At face value,
such evidence strongly urges the belief that the appellant was dealing
with the company alone and not with the respondents personally. As
this conclusion was not reached, it is submitted that the court did not
follow the "substantial intent" of the parties and the appellant
obtained more than he originally bargained for, viz: two extra parties
liable on the documents-Mr. Grosdanoff and Mr. Tracy.
In essence, this argument stands or falls on an interpretation of
the parol evidence rule. If we assume that the addition of the words
"President"and "Secretary" to the signatures of the respondents will
render the document ambiguous, the problem resolves itself into finding a method of enabling the court to write in these words without
altering, varying, or contradicting the written document.
It has been said that the case of the 'undisclosed principal' is an
exception to the parol evidence rule. The court will often allow parol
evidence of the existence and liability of a principal where only the
agent's name appears on the document. In Ca7der v. DobeZ38 where
the broker signed the contract in his own name without qualification,
Bovill, C.J., stated that:
if a broker enters into contracts in his own name, and has a
principal, those whom he contracts with will have the responsibility
both of the principal and of the broker. There is nothing inconsistent
in thus giving an option to hold either responsible. I am of opinion
that, in accordance with all the authorities, the parol evidence [of the
principal] was admissable.
It is asserted that such evidence only adds a party to the contract and
does not vary it.
In the Alliston case, the addition by way of parole evidence to
the effect that the company was the principal of the respondents
would be adding the company as a party liable on the cheque. Once
this is accomplished there is no harm in allowing evidence of what
types of agents the respondents were, that is, that they were president
and secretary respectively. At this point both the agents and the
company would be liable and so it appears that if for some reason
the plaintiff had wanted to sue the company, he could have done so.
Thus if the plaintiff's intention was to hold both the respondents an&
the company liable on the cheque when accepting it, he can now do so.
But what were the parties' intentions? There was evidence heard that
the goods for which the cheque was payment were goods purchased
for and by the company. On the cheque there appears the name of
the company. Evidence has been admitted that the respondents were
officers of the company whose job it was to issue such a cheque within
3

(,M)

L.R 6 C.P. 486.
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their authority. Assuming that there is evidence that the cheque
was drawn on the company's current account, it is readily seen that
for all intents and purposes, it was a company cheque.
Yet, notwithstanding the fact that the instrument is now ambiguous as to the intention of the respondents, a strict application of
the parol evidence rule will still find the president and secretary
liable because they did not qualify their signatures in fact, and so
appear liable on the face of the document. The court would most
likely not accept such a circular argument which strains so to render
the document ambiguous. The court would likely refuse to write
in the necessary qualifying words for the respondents where they did
not do so themselves. If the court did write in the qualifying words,

it is arguable that they would thereby be rendering ambiguous a

heretofore unambiguous document and so in effect varying the terms.
Thus, by treating the parol evidence rule as an 'exclusionary rule
of evidence' no parol evidence could reasonably be admitted in this
case and in that sense the decision is certainly correct. Yet, what is
the true nature of the rule?
There exists considerable doubt today if indeed the rule really is
an exclusionary rule of evidence. In their treatise on the law of
contracts Cheshire and Fifoot state:
in the third place, the exclusion is clearly inappropriate where the
document is designed to contain only part of the terms-where, in other
words, the parties have made their contract partly in writing and partly
by word of mouth. The situation is so comparatively frequent as in
effect to deprive the ban on oral evidence of the strict character of a
'rule of law' which has been attributed to it. It will be presumed, in the
which looks like a contract
words of a learned author, "that a document
is to be treated as the whole contract. 39 But this presumption, though
strong, is not irrebutable. In each case the court must decide whether
the parties have or have not reduced their agreement to the precise terms
of an all-embracing written formula. If they have, oral evidence will not
be admitted to vary or to contradict it; if they have not, the writing
is but part of the contract and must be set side by side with the complementary oral terms. The question is at bottom one of intention and,
like all such questions, elusive and conjectural. It would seem, however,
more recent tendency is to infer, if the inference is at all posthat the
but
sible,40 that the parties did not intend the writing to be exclusive
wished it to be read in conjunction with their oral statements.41

This passage suggests that the court should in the first place
hear all the oral evidence available and then decide if the written
contract was intended to be the complete expression of the parties'
intentions. Instead, it has been the practice of the court to decide
in the first place if the document could exist as a contract in its
written state alone. If answered in the affirmative and the document
was not ambiguous on its face, then no parol evidence was allowed.
It is suggested, however, that "if a dispute should arise as to the
39Mr. K. W. Wedderburn, Collateral Contracts, (1959) C.L.J. 58, esp.
pp. 59-64.
40 Italics added.
41
Cheshire and Fifoot, Law of Contract, 5th ed. at p. 101.
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terms of a contract made by word of mouth, it is necessary in the
first instance to ascertain what was said, and the circumstances under
which the... contract was formed." Similarly, in a written contract,
it is necessary in the first instance to ascertain all the circumstances
surrounding the formation of the contract and only in this light can
the court determine if the written contract is the true expression
of all the intentions of the parties which they intended to be part
of their contract.
In this light the parol evidence rule is not a strict rule of law
but can be easily overcome to allow extrinsic evidence. In the Afliston
case the preponderance of oral evidence indicates in the strongest
terms that it was a company cheque. Therefore the written document was not by itself intended to contain all the terms of the
parties for the very important term that the respondents were not
personally liable was missing, and the court should allow evidence
to this effect.
The decision of H. B. Etlin & Co. Ltd. v. Asselstyne 3 delivered
by McGillivray, J.A., was decided by the Ontario Court of Appeal
only six days after the A7liston case. In that case the plaintiff claimed
upon a cheque for $250.00 drawn upon the Bank of Montreal and
signed by the defendant who was president and manager of BensonWilcox Ltd. As to the cheque itself McGillivray, J.A., stated:
It is a printed cheque which the company has obviously prepared for its
personal use for it bears at the top in large letters the company nameBenson-Wilcox Ltd. and has at the bottom the printed name of the
company as drawer. In the left-hand corner appears the name of
Market Branch., Bank of Montreal, London, Canada, upon whom the
cheque is drawn. As this name appears on a cheque printed on company
stationery it must be assumed that the branch in question was the
company's bank. Immediately under the company's name as drawer
a line appears (also printed) designed to receive the signature of an
authorized person necessary to give validity to the printed company name
and on this line appears the name of the present defendant. This name
is the only writing appearing upon the cheque. At the top is typed the
cheque number "8458" which by its size I would think might44 indicate
it to belong to a company rather than that of an individual. On the
line following appears the typed words "H. B. Etlin Company Limited$250" and on the line after that is inscribed by a perforated stamp, the
words "Benson-Wilcox Electric Company-250 do7s. 00 cts.
At trial, parol evidence was admitted which made it clear that
the defendant signed only as a scribe for his company and not in his
personal capacity, for it was established that he was a signing officer
for the company. Other evidence that the plaintiff had accepted the
cheque in payment for goods sold to the company, that the plaintiff
was aware that it was a company cheque, and that the plaintiff had
accepted such cheques in the past was also admitted and considered.
The issue on appeal was whether such evidence had been properly
admitted and considered. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant
42
43

Anson's Law of Contract,Guest, 21st ed. at p. 128.
Supra, footnote 21.
44 No reasons are given for this proposition.
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was solely liable on the face of the document and that no parol
evidence was admissable.
In dismissing the appeal, McGillivray, J.A. first reviewed the
authorities which establish that in determining if a document is
ambiguous, regard must be had to the whole document. Then, after
mentioning and approving the decision in Fairchildet al.v. Ferguson
& Nolan4 5 and in Chapman v. Smethurst46 he turned to the case of
Daymond Motors v. Thistletown Developments Ltd. et a?. 47 and distinguished it on the facts. In this latter case the cheque was written
on plain paper and "had nothing upon it elsewhere to indicate that
it was not the note of the individual defendants. ' '48 Also in the
Daymond Motors case the signatures of the defendants did not
appear on any line reserved for them which would link their signatures to the company name, and so there was no ambiguity on the
document itself. Citing the remarks of Roach, J.A., in the Daymond
Motors case, "There may be cases where looking at the face of the
note, it is apparent that there is some ambiguity." Mr. Justice McGillivray concludes that this is such a case "and an inflexible application
of the common law rule in the circumstances here existing, I am
satisfied would lead to a gross miscarriage of justice." 49 In the result,
he decided that upon the face of the document the company was solely
liable but "at the very least it is ambiguous and it was proper that
evidence as to intention should be admitted at trial."' s
A close examination of the A~liston case and the Etlin case
reveals some interesting problems. In the latter case, Mr. Justice
McGillivray cites a passage from Smith's Leading Cases:
...it may be laid down as a general rule that, where a person signs
a contract in his own name without qualification, he is prima facie to
be deemed to be a person contracting personally; and in order to prevent
his liability from attaching, it must be apparent from the other portions
5

of the document that he did not intend to bind himself as principal. 1

He also notes that:
52
this statement of the law is of equal authority today.

Furthermore he says:
where, however, on the face of the document an ambiguity apears,
'extrinsic evidence may be admitted on the question of intention.53

These passages read together indicate that the addition of words
such as "manager" or "president" are not absolutely necessary to
render the document ambiguous where an ambiguity appears elsewhere. In a case where there are other sufficient manifestations of
45 Supra, footnote 30.
46 Supra, footnote 31.
47
Supra, footnote 27.

4s Supra., footnote 21 at p. 195.
49 Supra., footnote 21 at p. 195.

50 Ibid., at p. 194.
51 Smith's Leading Cases, 6th ed., at p. 344.
Supra, footnote 21 at p. 193.
53 Ibid., at p. 193.
52
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ambiguity such as the printed name of the company on the cheque
or printed lines for the signing officer's signature, the court will
allow in parol evidence. Although this entails a liberal interpretation
of the Bills of Exchange Act 54 which says that the mere addition of
words describing him as an agent or as filling a representative character does not exempt him from liability,5 5 it is precisely such an
interpretation which allows the court to overcome an "inflexible
'5
application of the common law rule." r
It is still pertinent to ask what the result would have been if the
respondents in the Alliston case had used a cheque similar to the one in
the Etlin case without writing in the words "President" and "Secretary". It is quite probable that if such a case arose today the court
would be able to find the document at least ambiguous and thereby
allow extrinsic evidence as to intention notwithstanding the fact that
no descriptive adjectives accompanied the signatures. Such a decision,
though an equitable one, would present a formidable problem to the
court as well as to the businessman.
Such cheques are written every day by companies of every conceivable size. Though this is speculative, it is probable that a larger
company would have as its signing officers men more familiar with
the law than those who sign for smaller companies. In addition, the
larger and wealthier companies are far more likely to use personalized
cheques and expensive 'protectograph' machines inscribing those
cheques than smaller companies. In the result, "Mr. One-Man Limited
Company" paying his business debts by cheque, simply stamping on
the company's name to indicate that it is a company cheque will be
more likely to incur personal liability on the document than the
signing officer of any larger corporation.
The differences between the two cheques are, of course, very
real and the law cannot consider whether the person writing the
cheque is employed by a large or small company. Nevertheless, it
is submitted that there exists today a general uncertainty of exactly
what is required on a cheque short of the words 'per pro' or their
equivalent to indicate that the signor assumes no personal liability.
The recent decision of Ind. Businessman's Credit Corp. v. Wainwright
Const. Ltd.57 affords a ready example of this latter proposition.
In this case a rubber stamp was used to name the company on
the promissory note while under the stamp there appeared a dotted
line and the word "President"; the individual defendant signing along
the dotted line. The case was heard by the Master, J. R. Kimber, who
held that parol evidence of the defendant's intention was admissable
as the document was ambiguous. Basing his decision on the similarity
54
Supra, footnote 3.
55
56 Ibid., s. 52(1).

Supra, footnote 49.

57 Supra, footnote 34.
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of facts to the case of Schaffer v. Tubby Smith & Co. 58 the Master
held that the use of the word "President" on the stamp together with
the fact that there was a space obviously left for the president's
signature made the document sufficiently ambiguous to allow the
court to admit parol evidence. There is no evidence that any names
or figures in the body of the cheque were anything but written so
as to suggest that it was a company cheque.
In his judgment, the Master also reviews in brief the case of
Loczke v. Ruthenian Farmers Co-op.59 In this case the defendants
signed a promissory note, "Ruthenian Farmers Co-op Co. Ltd. Glenella, J. 0. K. Kroske, President,W. Tzaryk, Manager" and were held
liable. The Master distinguishes that case from the situation in the
Wainwright case because in the former "the signature of the company
was not by way of a rubber stamp [as it was in Wainwright] but
was hand written. ' 60 Also, "In the Loczkca case, there was no coupling
of the signatures by a bracket or rubber stamp to tie the signatures
in with the company." 61
It is submitted that a signor who takes the time to write out
the name of a company in longhand on a cheque as well as writing
out his own position in that company does as much, if not more, to
show that it is a company cheque than the individual who uses a
rubber stamp and signs his name on the appropriate line. Such a
method of distinguishing cases becomes even more subtle if it be

shown (as it might possibly have been shown without altering the
decision) that the company in the Loczka case did not even own a
company stamp. It is also submitted that a bracket or rubber stamp
linking the signature of the signor to that of the company is entirely
unnecessary where the name of the company and that of the signor
appear sufficiently close together and it is a fact that the signor is
an employee of the company.
The Wainwright case is then exemplary of decisions which
strain to avoid the strictness of the parol evidence rule and thereby
aim to give effect to the true intentions of the parties. This alone
justifies such subtle distinctions as are used.
Even a perfunctory glance at any text book dealing with procuration signatures will be sufficient to illustrate how numerous and
diversified are the decisions dealing with this problem in our jurisdiction alone. Most decisions conflicting in result can be justified by
minor or major differences in the facts of the individual cases. But
because negotiable instruments for obvious reasons tend to be in a
standard form, the number of possible inherent distinguishing factors
become increasingly smaller and the resulting actual distinctions
made by the court become increasingly abstruse. Such a multitude
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of diversified decisions as exists militates against any possibility of
reconciling the numerous incongruities to be found. Furthermore
it appears that any attempt to reconcile recent cases with a stricter
reading of the Bills of Exchange Act 62 would be a step in a backward
direction at least as far as any 'equitable' decision is concerned. As
a result, and so as to avoid the necessity of postulating an uncommodious series of untested hypotheticals, it is submitted (as is so often
the case) that any settlement of the problem must come by way of
amendment or novel legislation.
SHELDON ESBnINi
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